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Feeling Queer Jurisprudence: Injury, Intimacy, Identity 
By Senthorun Sunil Raj. London: Routledge, 2020 
Feeling Queer Jurisprudence: Injury, Intimacy, Identity is a nuanced and multi-layered text. Embedded 
in queer affect theory and law and emotion scholarship, the book offers a detailed blend of case analysis 
and theoretical work as it considers ‘how injury is emotionally rendered in acts that stigmatise, shame, 
or disavow non-heterosexual intimacies and identities because they disturb a social order that values 
matrimonial coupling and reproductive sexuality’ (Raj 2020, 3). The legal and juridical recognition of 
such injuries can be shaped by LGBTQ people’s emotional responses to the harms they have suffered, 
but as Raj reminds us, the space of judicial recognition of both emotion and injury is a ‘precarious 
terrain’ (Ibid, 140).  
Raj makes a compelling case for the analysis of emotion and emotional registers of law. Focusing on 
cases that have addressed the rights of LGBTQ individuals and groups from multiple jurisdictions, but 
most notably the US, Australia and the UK, the book argues that emotion has both political and analytic 
value (Raj 2020, 9). Raj shows how bodies and affects are differentially organised and oriented (Ahmed 
2006) relative to each other in case law and how emotion shapes these affective arrangements, giving 
form and visibility to different types of injury or pain experienced by LGBTQ people, and making 
tangible particular aspects of LGBTQ lives.  In so doing, emotion can both illuminate and hide the 
contours of LGBTQ intimacy and identity. 
This perspective allows Raj to navigate the different scales and structures through which LGBTQ 
individuals face injustices and suffer emotional harm. He notes that, ‘[s]hifts in an individual’s “bad 
feeling”, without changes to the structural or discursive conditions that give rise to such feeling, render 
the emotive appeal to pursue effective legal remedies fleeting and counterproductive for those who 
desperately seek such remedies’ (Raj 2020, 13). Emotion is powerful: it connects us, provokes a 
reaction, operates as a catalyst for change. In his close reading of LGBT cases however, Raj is able to 
show how legal remedies that recognise the emotions of individual litigants may reify these emotions 
in institutional structures in ways that may have unexpected consequences or facilitate forms of legal 
recognition that depoliticise the operation of long lasting structural violence.  
The conclusion that can be drawn from Raj’s analysis is thus not that we should approach emotion as a 
positive or negative presence in law, but as an inescapable aspect of jurisprudential writing and legal 
reasoning (Raj 2020, 12). The challenge is to account for how emotions open and close down space for 
the presence of queer identities and intimacies within law and legal spaces (Raj 2020, 141). Having set 
out the case for this form of analysis in the first chapter of the book, the following chapters are each 
devoted to reading specific emotions in the texts of LGBT cases. Chapter two focuses on disgust, 
beginning with judicial disgust directed towards gay, bisexual and queer men in decriminalisation and 
sadomasochism cases, before turning to the projection of disgust on homophobic killers. Chapter three 
analyses hate, through hate crimes and hate crime legislation. This is followed in chapter four by an 
exploration of anger felt by LGBTQ individuals and refracted in law and unlawful discrimination cases. 
Chapter five traces how fear is crystallised in LGBTQ asylum decisions, analysing both the fear 
experienced by those seeking asylum and by judges who fear the asylum system will be abused. Finally, 
chapter six examines judicial expressions of love and monogamous love in equal marriage cases.  
The cases examined span jurisdictions: they have been selected in order to ‘bring together the ways 
emotions shape progressive ideas of injury, intimacy, and identity’ rather than to ‘exhaustively account 
for their jurisdictional or cultural or stylistic particularity’ (Raj 2020, 6). While this approach departs 
from traditional doctrinal scholarship, for many queer legal scholars, the majority of the cases analysed 
are familiar. Raj’s analysis, and the analytic lens he adopts towards emotion in these cases allows us to 
re-encounter these texts and perhaps to perceive something new within their familiar language. Drawing 
upon Johns, we are invited to ‘linger’ over the problem: to take our time and to reflect on the analytical 
tools at our disposal (Ibid, 7).  
This commitment to lingering over the texts is one of several engagements with temporality in the book. 
The other most notable temporal analysis is found in the use of the lens of emotion to question the 
march of LGBT progress through law. Raj shows clearly the paradox of legal recognition and protection 
that comes at the expense of the erasure of structural violence or the imposition of respectability and 
heteronormativity on queer communities. There is a deliberate ambivalence in Raj’s approach to the 
cases that he analyses: litigation is not presented as antithetical to securing better lives for LGBTQ 
people, but his reading of the structural dimensions of emotion demonstrates the violence and harm that 
can still be caused to LGBTQ individuals and groups by progressive LGBTQ legal and political 
projects. The focus on emotion makes clear the tension between law as a means of pursuing legal justice 
that makes queers visible, and the possibility of queerer forms of social justice that are less reliant on 
law. In this way, Raj brings a further analytical dimension to a familiar debate within activist scholarship 
– that of the limits of legal progress (Franke 2012; Weber 2016) and the complexities of queerness and 
time (Ahmed 2006; 2010; Berlant 2011;  Edelman 2004; Freeman 2005). 
A similar layer of nuance is brought to a second familiar theme in queer scholarship: that of how 
LGBTQ communities negotiate visibility and invisibility. As Currier (2010, 156) reminds us, the 
operation of visibility – be it evading danger through invisibility or manifesting presence in visibility – 
is vital to understanding and changing LGBTQ lives. Sedgwick (1991, 71) famously describes the closet 
and coming out as the overarching structure of western (Tucker 2009) gay oppression this century. And 
from a more legal perspective, Johnson (2010) has traced how the spectre of the closet has influenced 
the pursuit of LGBT rights through the prism of the protection of privacy, and the limitations of this. 
Raj touches on questions of privacy in his analysis of disgust, but also extends the analysis further by 
exploring how regimes of emotional visibility operate in law, how different emotions are rendered 
legally visible or invisible and what the effects of these differential visibilities can be. For example, Raj 
shows how the crystallisation of disgust in case law can be used both to avoid recognising queer 
intimacies or identities but can also be used to reposition these intimacies into respectability and 
acceptability in a way that expunges them of ‘abject queerness’. Similarly, the language of hate crime 
can draw attention to egregious violence committed by individuals while simultaneously shielding the 
possibility of recognition of other forms of social or structural violence. The language of love can 
perform a similar organisational function, detaching respectable, aspirational familial sexuality from 
‘deviant’ otherness. This perspective also allows us to reflect on who is allowed to feel which emotions 
within case law. For example, the moving and detailed chapter on refugee claims shows how fear is 
separated from worry, anxiety and other emotions and given a legal legitimacy that allows a path to 
asylum.  
The value of this analysis is that it retains a commitment to the ambivalence of emotional encounters in 
law. Raj rightly does not attempt to simplify the operation of emotion into a positive or a negative 
outcome for those seeking LGBTQ justice. He instead recognises the complexity of outcomes as 
emotions arrange and crystallise particular patterns and modes of action. Emotion can be a powerful 
catalyst for action and change (as discussed in the chapter on anger), it might also lead to a lack of 
action (as the individualising effects of hate crime legislation risk impeding action of structural 
violence), or to an impasse or even a withdrawal as emotions come into conflict (see eg. Cooper 2019). 
Thus, ‘[r]eading emotion is not about condemning those who gleefully washed their Facebook profile 
photos in rainbows when Obergefell was decided. Rather, it is an analytic strategy that can politically 
affirm the partial utility of such decisions while making legal room to support queer intimacies and 
identities’ (Raj, 2020 134). 
In this way, Raj taps into Cooper’s (2019, 17) observation that ‘the value of legal texts here comes 
particularly from the stories judges tell.’ These stories are multiple, complex and ‘far from settled and 
clear’ (Ibid).  A key contribution of this book is the methodology that it develops for unpacking judicial 
stories by turning an analytic lens towards emotion. This has much in common with feminist projects 
that have sought to re-visit case law through a feminist perspective (eg Hunter et al. 2010). As a queer 
project (or a project that seeks to queer both law and emotions) it develops the kind of approach 
suggested by Colebrook (2009, 21), in which she argues that conditions of the queer are those which 
expose how ‘the normal is achieved, produced, effected and also, therefore exposed as contingent, 
constituted and open to change’. Thus Raj not only demonstrates the presence of emotion in law 
(thereby challenging the idea of law as neutral, objective or rational) but also traces how these emotions 
come to be reified in law, and what the effects of this are. This implicitly holds open the possibility that 
these emotional registers might be changed – or queered – thus retaining the potential for new ways of 
acting, being or feeling.  
Raj states explicitly that the book is not intended as a conclusion to politics of queer law reform: it is a 
methodology for attending to emotion as part of a long and ongoing project. He concludes the book 
with a discussion of how scholars, lawyers and activists might better reflect on emotion in LGBTQ 
work. While understanding the danger of being too prescriptive in these reflections, it would be 
interesting to see this analysis taken forward – what kinds of cases might we pursue in order to ‘confront 
emotional attachments in law to advocate more expansive accommodation of queer intimacies and 
identities’ (Raj 2020, 151). Or indeed, how we might analyse the crystallisation of emotion in other 
forms of queer activism or action beyond the courts and the push for legal progress. 
A final and related query can be drawn from the book’s own commitment to lingering over the problem: 
that of how we might further complicate, or even queer, the case law analysed in order to trace further 
possibilities for action. As Raj notes, emotions are complex and rarely exist in isolation; one might 
wonder if something is lost by identifying one particular line of cases with one particular emotion and 
whether these or other cases could be revisited to explore whether there are emotional counternarratives 
that can be identified. For example, how do we account for the fact that judicial crystallisations of fear 
in asylum cases might be accompanied by recognition of joy or freedom – often in the same case?1 
Similarly, what roles might collective expressions of emotions such as sorrow or grief (such as during 
the AIDS crises of the 1980s and 1990s or currently in response to high levels of violence and 
victimisation faced by trans women and particularly trans women of colour) play in refining, shaping 
and de-individualising legal constructions of anger and injury?  
These questions are not so much criticisms as provocations that build on Raj’s excellent and nuanced 
work. In recognising emotion in law, Raj reminds us that we live complex emotional lives as part of 
complex affective assemblages – this complexity is reduced in judicial narratives, but there remains the 
possibility of returning to the fullness of our affective arrangements to seek out new forms of action, or 
simply to question why some emotions are reified in case law, while others remain legally unseen.  
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